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CIA AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
BY ROBERT M. GATES
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

INTRODUCTION

OVER THE YEARS, PUBLIC VIEWS OF CIA AND ITS ROLE IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY HAVE BEEN SHAPED PRIMARILY BY MOVIES, TELEVISION, NOVELS, NEWSPAPERS, BOOKS BY JOURNALISTS, HEADLINES GROWING OUT OF CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES, EXPOSES BY FORMER INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS, AND ESSAYS BY EXPERTS WHO HAVE NEVER SERVED IN AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE AND BY SOME WHO HAVE SERVED AND STILL NEVER UNDERSTOOD OUR ROLE. WE ARE SAID TO BE AN INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT AND YET ARE THE MOST VISIBLE, MOST EXTERNALLY SCRUTINIZED AND MOST PUBLICIZED INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IN THE WORLD. WHILE WE SOMETIMES ARE ABLE TO REFUTE PUBLICLY ALLEGATIONS AND CRITICISM AGAINST US, USUALLY WE MUST REMAIN SILENT. THE RESULT IS A CONTRADICTORY MELANGE OF IMAGES OF CIA AND VERY LITTLE UNDERSTANDING OF OUR REAL ROLE IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT.

TONIGHT, I WOULD LIKE TO TRY TO ILLUMINATE, AND I HOPE EXPAND, YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF CIA'S ROLE IN THE MAKING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY.

THIS ROLE TAKES THREE BROAD FORMS:

- FIRST, CIA IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE COLLECTION, ANALYSIS AND DISTRIBUTION OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION TO POLICYMAKERS, PRINCIPALLY THE PRESIDENT, THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE DEPARTMENTS OF STATE AND DEFENSE -- ALTHOUGH IN RECENT YEARS MANY OTHER DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES HAVE BECOME MAJOR USERS OF INTELLIGENCE. THIS IS A WELL KNOWN AREA, AND I WILL SPEAK OF IT ONLY SUMMARILY.
- SECOND, CIA IS CHARGED WITH THE CONDUCT OF COVERT ACTION, THE ONE AREA WHERE WE IMPLEMENT POLICY. THIS IS A SUBJECT SO COMPLEX AND SO CONTROVERSIAL AS TO REQUIRE SEPARATE TREATMENT AT ANOTHER TIME, ANOTHER PLACE.
- THIRD, AND MOST SIGNIFICANT, CIA'S ROLE IS PLAYED OUT IN THE INTERACTION, PRIMARILY IN WASHINGTON, BETWEEN CIA AND THE POLICY COMMUNITY. IT IS IN THE DYNAMICS OF THIS RELATIONSHIP THAT THE INFLUENCE AND ROLE OF CIA ARE DETERMINED -- WHETHER CIA'S ASSESSMENTS ARE HEEDDED OR NOT, WHETHER CIA'S INFORMATION IS RELEVANT AND TIMELY ENOUGH TO BE USEFUL, AND WHETHER CIA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH POLICYMAKERS FROM ISSUE TO ISSUE AND

PROBLEM TO PROBLEM, IS SUPPORTIVE OR ADVERSARIAL. IT IS THIS DYNAMIC INTERACTION OF INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY THAT IS THE LEAST WELL UNDERSTOOD AND IT IS THIS AREA THAT I WILL FOCUS ON TONIGHT.

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, THE DCI, SERVES BOTH AS DIRECTOR OF CIA AND HEAD OF THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, WHICH ENCOMPASSES CIA; THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY; THE INTELLIGENCE COMPONENTS OF THE DEPARTMENTS OF STATE, TREASURY, ENERGY, AND THE FOUR MILITARY SERVICES; AND THE FBI. OF THESE, ONLY CIA IS COMPLETELY INDEPENDENT OF ANY POLICY DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY AND ACCEPTS REQUESTS FOR INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FROM THROUGHOUT THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH. IT IS THE DCI AND CIA THAT SERVE AS THE PRINCIPAL CONDUITS OF INTELLIGENCE TO THE PRESIDENT AND NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL PRINCIPALS.

WHAT THEN, DOES CIA DO? BECAUSE OF THE MEDIA'S FOCUS ON COVERT ACTION, I WOULD LIKE TO SAY FIRST OF ALL THAT OVER 95 PERCENT OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BUDGET IS DEVOTED TO THE COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION. ABOUT THREE PERCENT OF CIA'S PEOPLE ARE INVOLVED IN COVERT ACTION.

COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

NOW, IF WE ARE NOT SPENDING MOST OF OUR TIME AND MONEY ATTEMPTING TO OVERTHROW GOVERNMENTS, WHAT EXACTLY DOES CIA DO? AS JOHN RANELAGH SAYS IN HIS HISTORY OF CIA, "TO THE PRESENT THE CIA IS AN ECHO OF ITS FOUNDERS. ITS JOB IS NOT TO FIND ENEMIES BUT TO DEFINE THEM. ITS THEME IS THE SUBSTITUTION OF INTELLIGENCE FOR FORCE." CIA DEVOTES THE OVERWHELMING PREPONDERANCE OF ITS RESOURCES TO MONITORING AND REPORTING ON DAY TO DAY DEVELOPMENTS AROUND THE WORLD, AND DETERMINING AND RESPONDING TO POLICYMAKERS' LONGER RANGE REQUIREMENTS FOR INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS.

WHAT IS INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND HOW IS IT USED BY THE POLICYMAKER? OUR INFORMATION COMES FROM SATELLITES; NEWSPAPERS, PERIODICALS, RADIO, AND TELEVISION WORLDWIDE; DIPLOMATS AND MILITARY ATTACHES OVERSEAS; AND, OF COURSE, FROM SECRET AGENTS. THAT INFORMATION FLOWS TO WASHINGTON WHERE ANALYSTS, WITH BACKGROUNDS IN SCORES OF DISCIPLINES, SIFT THROUGH IT, EXAMINE IT, COLLATE IT, AND TRY TO MAKE SENSE OF THE BILLIONS OF BITS AND PIECES THAT COME TO US ON ISSUES AND DEVELOPMENTS WORLD-WIDE OF INTEREST TO THE UNITED STATES. WE THEN REPORT OUR FINDINGS TO POLICY OFFICIALS AND TO THE MILITARY.

WHAT CLEARLY DISTINGUISHES INFORMATION SUITABLE FOR INTELLIGENCE EXPLOITATION IS ITS RELEVANCE TO US POLICY AND US INTERESTS. IT IS THE COMPREHENSIVENESS OF OUR COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS, THEIR FOCUS ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES, AND THE ADVANTAGE OF UNIQUE OR PRIOR KNOWLEDGE, THAT MAKE INTELLIGENCE VALUABLE TO THE POLICYMAKER. OFTEN, WE MAKE A CONTRIBUTION SIMPLY THROUGH OUR ABILITY TO ORGANIZE THE FACTS IN A CLEAR AND CONCISE WAY, BY PROVIDING THE SAME FACTS TO DIFFERENT ORGANIZATIONS, AND BY IDENTIFYING THE IMPORTANT QUESTIONS -- AND BY TRYING TO ANSWER THEM.

THIS INFORMATION FINDS ITS WAY TO THE POLICYMAKER IN SEVERAL WAYS:

- FIRST, INTELLIGENCE ON DAY TO DAY EVENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS AROUND THE WORLD IS PROVIDED TO SENIOR OFFICIALS DAILY OR EVEN SEVERAL TIMES A DAY.
- SECOND, THE CIA CONTRIBUTES ANALYSIS TO POLICY PAPERS DESCRIBING BOTH EVENTS AT HAND AND POTENTIAL OPPORTUNITIES OR PROBLEMS FOR THE UNITED STATES. NEARLY ALL NSC AND SUB-CABINET MEETINGS BEGIN WITH AN INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING.

- THIRD, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES CAN PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE MAKING OF POLICY. THESE ESTIMATES ARE THE MOST FORMAL EXPRESSION OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S VIEWS. ALL OF THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES OF THE GOVERNMENT BOTH CONTRIBUTE TO AND COORDINATE ON WHAT IS SAID IN THESE ESTIMATES.
- FOURTH, POLICYMAKERS RECEIVE SPECIALIZED ASSESSMENTS BY INDIVIDUAL AGENCIES. CIA'S ASSESSMENTS OR RESEARCH PROGRAM IS THE PRODUCT OF THE LARGEST INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS ORGANIZATION IN THE WORLD. THE RANGE OF ISSUES IS BREATHTAKING -- FROM STRATEGIC WEAPONS TO FOOD SUPPLIES; EPIDEMIOLOGY TO SPACE; WATER AND CLIMATE TO THIRD WORLD POLITICAL INSTABILITY; MINERAL AND ENERGY RESOURCES TO INTERNATIONAL FINANCE; SOVIET LASER WEAPONS TO REMOTE TRIBAL DEMOGRAPHICS; CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION TO COMMODITY SUPPLIES; AND MANY, MANY MORE.

CIA-POLICY RELATIONSHIPS

SO FAR, SO GOOD. WHAT I HAVE JUST REVIEWED IS A TEXTBOOK DESCRIPTION OF THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE. IT IS NEAT, UNAMBIGUOUS, CLINICAL, NON-CONTROVERSIAL, EVEN COMMENDABLE -- AND HIGHLY MISLEADING. WHAT ABOUT USERS WHO LOOK NOT FOR DATA OR UNDERSTANDING, BUT FOR SUPPORT FOR DECISIONS ALREADY MADE; OR THOSE WHO SELECTIVELY USE OR MISSTATE INTELLIGENCE TO INFLUENCE PUBLIC DEBATE OVER POLICY; OR USERS WHO LABEL INTELLIGENCE THEY DISLIKE AS TOO SOFT, TOO HARD OR COOKED; OR INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS WITH THEIR OWN AGENDAS OR BIASES; OR THE IMPLICATIONS FOR INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY OF A CIA DIRECTOR HELD AT TOO GREAT A DISTANCE FROM THE PRESIDENT OR ONE WHO IS HELD TOO CLOSE; OR THE FRUSTRATIONS OF CONSTANTLY CHANGING EVALUATIONS, OR ANALYSIS THAT IS JUST PLAIN WRONG; OR THE USE OF INTELLIGENCE AS A POLITICAL FOOTBALL BETWEEN GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS OR BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES? THE ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR OF OFFICIALS IN CIA AND POLICY AGENCIES THAT LIE BEHIND THESE AND MANY SIMILAR ISSUES AND THE INTERACTION AMONG THEM COMPRISE THE DYNAMIC OF THE RELATIONSHIP -- WHAT PROFESSOR YEHOSEFAT HARKABI OF HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM DESCRIBES AS "THE INTELLIGENCE-POLICYMAKER TANGLE."

IN 1949, SHERMAN KENT, IN HIS BOOK STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE FOR AMERICAN WORLD POLICY, SAID "THERE IS NO PHASE OF THE INTELLIGENCE BUSINESS WHICH IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE PROPER RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE ITSELF AND THE PEOPLE WHO USE ITS PRODUCT. ODDLY ENOUGH, THIS RELATIONSHIP, WHICH ONE WOULD EXPECT TO ESTABLISH ITSELF AUTOMATICALLY, DOES NOT DO THIS."

THE FACT IS THAT, OVER THE YEARS, THE POLICYMAKER AND THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER HAVE CONSISTENTLY -- AND WITH FRIGHTENINGLY FEW EXCEPTIONS -- COME TOGETHER HUGELY IGNORANT OF THE REALITIES AND COMPLEXITIES OF EACH OTHER'S WORLD -- PROCESS, TECHNIQUE, FORM AND CULTURE. CIA OFFICERS CAN TELL YOU IN EXCRUCIATING DETAIL HOW FOREIGN POLICY IS MADE IN EVERY COUNTRY IN THE WORLD SAVE ONE -- THE UNITED STATES. BY THE SAME TOKEN, AS SUGGESTED BY PROFESSOR HARKABI, THE UNHAPPINESS OF INTELLIGENCE PEOPLE SWELLS "WHEN THEY COMPARE THE SOPHISTICATION AND ADVANCED METHODS EMPLOYED IN COLLECTION OF THE INFORMATION AND THE PRODUCTION OF INTELLIGENCE AGAINST THE CAVALIER FASHION OR IMPROVISATION WITH WHICH POLICY DECISIONS ARE MANY A TIME REACHED."

BOOKSHELVES GROAN UNDER THE LITERATURE OF PROPOSED RULES OF ENGAGEMENT WHEN THESE TWO WORLDS COLLIDE. IN 1956, FOR EXAMPLE, ROGER HILSMAN WROTE THAT INTELLIGENCE PRODUCERS MUST "ORIENT THEMSELVES FRANKLY AND CONSCIOUSLY TOWARD POLICY AND ACTION ... ADAPTING TOOLS EXPRESSLY TO THE NEEDS OF POLICY."

OTHERS, AS DESCRIBED IN ONE INTELLIGENCE MONOGRAPH, ARGUED THAT "THE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCER SHOULD INITIATE NO DIRECT INTERACTION WITH HIS CONSUMERS, BUT RATHER SHOULD RESPOND TO REQUESTS FOR DATA AND ANALYSIS."

SHERMAN KENT OF YALE AND THEN OF CIA WAS PERHAPS THE FIRST OF THE EARLY INTELLIGENCE COMMENTATORS TO SEE THE NEED FOR A DIFFERENT, MORE DIRECT AND INTENSIVE INTERACTION BETWEEN POLICYMAKER AND INTELLIGENCE OFFICER. WARNING THAT PROTECTING THE OBJECTIVITY OF THE INTELLIGENCE ANALYST COULD BE LIKENED TO PILING ARMOR ON A MEDIEVAL KNIGHT UNTIL HE WAS ABSOLUTELY SAFE BUT COMPLETELY USELESS, KENT CONCLUDED THAT THE GREATER DANGER TO AN EFFECTIVE ROLE WAS IN BEING TOO DISTANT. EVEN SO, HE FORESAW A TROUBLED RELATIONSHIP -- THAT INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS' SKEPTICISM OF POLICYMAKERS' OBJECTIVITY -- AND THE LATTER'S CONSEQUENT RESENTMENT -- WOULD STULTIFY A FREE GIVE AND TAKE BETWEEN THEM; THAT POLICYMAKERS WOULD SEE THE VERY FACT OF CIA ASSESSMENTS AS AN INSULT TO THEIR OWN INTELLECTUAL CAPABILITIES; THAT SECURITY CONCERNS BY EACH PARTY WOULD ENCOURAGE WARINESS AND RETICENCE. AND, IN TRUTH, THESE AND OTHER DIFFICULTIES STILL LARGELY SHAPE CIA'S ROLE IN FOREIGN POLICY PROCESS.

LET ME ELABORATE ON THESE DIFFICULTIES -- ON THE REALITY OF A ROUGH AND TUMBLE WORLD -- BASED ON PERSONAL EXPERIENCE IN BOTH WORLDS AT DIFFERENT TIMES UNDER FIVE PRESIDENTS.

THE INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY OF THE AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE -- OF CIA -- IS UNIQUE IN THE WORLD. WHILE THIS CONFERS CERTAIN ADVANTAGES, ABOVE ALL INDEPENDENCE, SUCH AUTONOMY ALSO IMBUES THE CIA-POLICY COMMUNITY RELATIONSHIP WITH A SIGNIFICANT ADVERSARIAL AS WELL AS SUPPORTIVE CONTENT. AND, THE POLICYMAKER HAS A LONG LIST OF GRIEVANCES, MANY LEGITIMATE, SOME NOT.

-- POLICYMAKERS LEGITIMATELY WANT INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION THAT WILL INFORM AND GUIDE THEIR TACTICAL DAY TO DAY DECISIONMAKING. IN SOME AREAS, WE CAN AND DO MEET THEIR NEEDS. FOR EXAMPLE, IN 1980, THANKS TO A VERY BRAVE MAN, WE WERE ABLE TO PROVIDE POLICYMAKERS WITH KNOWLEDGE OF THE STEP BY STEP PREPARATIONS FOR THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW IN POLAND. IN EARLY 1986, WE WERE ABLE TO DOCUMENT IN EXTRAORDINARY DETAIL ELECTORAL CHEATING IN THE PHILIPPINES. THERE ARE EVEN SOME AREAS WHERE OUR INTELLIGENCE IS SO GOOD THAT IT REDUCES POLICYMAKERS FLEXIBILITY AND ROOM FOR MANEUVER. YET, I WOULD HAVE TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THERE ARE COUNTRIES AND ISSUES IMPORTANT TO THE UNITED STATES WHERE SUCH TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE -- MOST OFTEN POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE -- IS SORELY DEFICIENT AND POLICYMAKER COMPLAINTS ARE JUSTIFIED. OUR CAPABILITIES ARE MUCH IMPROVED IN RECENT YEARS, BUT STILL UNEVEN. AND NO

MATTER HOW GOOD WE ARE, THERE WILL STILL BE SURPRISES OR GAPS.

-- IT WILL NOT SURPRISE YOU THAT VERY FEW POLICYMAKERS WELCOME CIA INFORMATION WHICH DIRECTLY OR BY INFERENCE CHALLENGES THE SUCCESS OR ADEQUACY OF THEIR POLICIES OR THE ACCURACY OF THEIR PRONOUNCEMENTS. INDEED, DURING THE VIETNAM WAR, A CONSTANT REFRAIN FROM POLICYMAKERS WAS, "AREN'T YOU GUYS ON THE TEAM?" YET, I CONCEDE THAT ON MORE THAN A FEW OCCASIONS, POLICYMAKERS HAVE ANALYZED OR FORECAST DEVELOPMENTS BETTER THAN WE. AND, TRUTH BE KNOWN, ANALYSTS HAVE SOMETIMES GONE OVERBOARD TO PROVE A POLICYMAKER WRONG. WHEN SECRETARY OF STATE HAIG ASSERTED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE BEHIND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, ANALYSTS INITIALLY SET OUT NOT TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE IN ALL ITS ASPECTS BUT RATHER TO PROVE THE SECRETARY WRONG -- TO PROVE SIMPLY THAT THE SOVIETS DO NOT ORCHESTRATE ALL INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. BUT IN SO DOING, THEY WENT TOO FAR THEMSELVES AND FAILED IN EARLY DRAFTS TO DESCRIBE EXTENSIVE AND WELL-DOCUMENTED INDIRECT SOVIET SUPPORT FOR TERRORIST GROUPS AND THEIR SPONSORS. FAR FROM KOW-TOWING TO THE POLICYMAKER, THERE IS SOMETIMES A STRONG IMPULSE ON THE PART OF INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS TO SHOW THAT A POLICY OR DECISION IS MISGUIDED OR WRONG, TO POKE AN ANALYTICAL FINGER IN THE POLICY EYE.

POLICYMAKERS KNOW THIS AND UNDERSTANDABLY RESENT IT.
TO PROTECT THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE ANALYST WHILE
KEEPING SUCH IMPULSES IN CHECK IS ONE OF THE TOUGHEST
JOBS OF INTELLIGENCE MANAGERS.

-- IN THIS CONNECTION, THE POLICYMAKER SOMETIMES HAS THE
SENSE THAT CIA IS ATTEMPTING, AT LEAST BY INFERENCE, TO
"GRADE" HIS PERFORMANCE. FURTHER, THE POLICYMAKER IS
OFTEN SUSPICIOUS THAT WHEN CIA'S ANALYSIS SUGGESTS
POLICY IS FAILING OR IN DIFFICULTY, THESE CONCLUSIONS
ARE, WITH MALICE, WIDELY CIRCULATED BY THE AGENCY FOR
USE AS AMMUNITION BY CRITICS OF THE POLICY INSIDE THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH, WITH CONGRESS OR WITH THE PUBLIC.

-- OFTEN POLICYMAKERS, FACING A SITUATION OF EXTREME
DELICACY WITH ANOTHER COUNTRY, ESPECIALLY WHERE US LAW
OR POLITICAL SENSITIVITIES MAY BE INVOLVED, WILL
CAUTION US AS WE WRITE OR BRIEF: "NOW, YOU HAVE TO BE
CAREFUL WHAT YOU SAY ABOUT THIS -- LET'S WORK IT OUT
TOGETHER BEFOREHAND." AND, WHILE PROTECTING OUR
INDEPENDENCE, WE DO TRY TO BE CAREFUL AND WE DO TRY TO
TAKE THEIR CONCERNS INTO ACCOUNT -- BUT THAT IS LITTLE
SOLACE TO A POLICYMAKER WHO IS AT THE POLITICAL MERCY
OF ANY CIA BRIEFER WHO GOES TO CAPITOL HILL.

-- MANY POLICYMAKERS BELIEVE CIA ALLOWS ITS BIASES TO DOMINATE ITS REPORTING. WHO WOULD DISAGREE THAT CIA OFFICERS HAVE VIEWS AND BIASES, AND THAT THEY TRY TO PROMOTE THEM? BUT, CIA IS NOT MONOLITHIC; THERE IS A WIDE RANGE OF VIEWS INSIDE ON VIRTUALLY EVERY ISSUE. INDEED, THE INTERNAL DEBATES ARE FIERCE AND SOMETIMES BRUTAL -- AFTER ALL, THE STAKES ARE VERY HIGH. IT IS NOT A PLACE FOR THE FAINT-HEARTED. WE HAVE ELABORATE PROCEDURES FOR REVIEWING ASSESSMENTS TO TRY TO FILTER OUT INDIVIDUAL BIAS AND MAKE OUR REPORTING AS OBJECTIVE AS POSSIBLE. AND WHEN WE SEND OUT A PROVOCATIVE ANALYSIS BY AN INDIVIDUAL WE TRY ALWAYS TO IDENTIFY IT AS A PERSONAL VIEW.

BEYOND THIS, IS THERE AN INSTITUTIONAL BIAS THAT AFFECTS OUR WORK? PROBABLY, IN SOME AREAS, IN THE BROADEST SENSE, AND PERHAPS BASED ON EXPERIENCE. AS AN INSTITUTION, WE ARE PROBABLY MORE SKEPTICAL OF SOVIET INTENTIONS THAN MOST; MORE CYNICAL ABOUT THE PUBLIC POSTURE OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS WHEN CONTRASTED TO THEIR ACTIONS, OVERT AND COVERT; MORE DOUBTFUL ABOUT THE EASE AND SPEED WITH WHICH THE UNITED STATES CAN USUALLY AFFECT DEVELOPMENTS OVERSEAS; AND, FAIRLY CONSISTENTLY, WE WILL TEND TO SEE PERILS AND DIFFICULTY WHERE OTHERS DO NOT.

SUSPICIONS THAT CIA'S ASSESSMENTS ARE BIASED IN AREAS WHERE CIA IS INVOLVED IN COVERT ACTION FAIL TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT OUR REALIZATION THAT OUR WORK IN SUCH AREAS IS SCRUTINIZED WITH SPECIAL CARE BY OTHERS (ESPECIALLY THE CONGRESS) FOR SIGNS OF BIAS. THE ORGANIZATIONAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANALYSIS FROM OPERATIONS IS BUTTRESSED BY INTERNAL AGENCY RIVALRIES.

-- POLICYMAKERS' IMPATIENCE WITH INTELLIGENCE -- WITH CIA -- IS INTENSIFIED BY THE FACT THAT WE ARE SOMETIMES WRONG IN OUR ANALYSIS AND FORECASTS, AND WE OFTEN CHANGE OUR ASSESSMENTS BASED ON NEW ANALYSIS OR NEW INFORMATION. WE DO NOT ACKNOWLEDGE ERROR GRACEFULLY, AND OFTEN DO NOT FOREWARN POLICYMAKERS OF REVISED VIEWS BEFORE THE INFORMATION HITS THE STREET. A POLICYMAKER WHO HAS MADE DECISIONS BASED ON ONE ASSESSMENT ONLY TO SEE IT CHANGE OR TO FIND THAT IT WAS WRONG WILL NOT THINK FONDLY OF US OR SOON WISH AGAIN TO PROCEED ON OUR ASSURANCES OR ASSESSMENTS.

-- AS I SUGGESTED EARLIER, A SPECIAL CRITICISM BY POLICYMAKERS IS THAT CIA IS TOO FREQUENTLY A VOICE OF GLOOM AND DOOM. FOR POLICYMAKERS WHO MUST TRY TO FIND SOLUTIONS FOR INTRACTABLE PROBLEMS OR A WAY OUT OF A NO-WIN SITUATION, OUR FOREBODINGS AND POINTING OUT OF

PERILS AND DANGERS ARE OF LITTLE HELP AND ARE HIGHLY AGGRAVATING.

-- CIA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH CONGRESS ALSO IS A SPECIAL PROBLEM FOR POLICYMAKERS FOR SEVERAL REASONS, AND IT PROFOUNDLY INFLUENCES OUR ROLE. VIRTUALLY ALL CIA ASSESSMENTS GO TO THE TWO CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES. MOST GO ALSO TO THE ARMED SERVICES, FOREIGN RELATIONS, AND APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES. IN 1986, CIA SENT SOME 5000 INTELLIGENCE REPORTS TO CONGRESS AND GAVE MANY HUNDREDS OF BRIEFINGS. ALL THIS IS NEW IN THE LAST DECADE OR SO. AS A RESULT, AND THANKS TO THEIR STAFFS, MANY SENATORS AND REPRESENTATIVES ARE OFTEN BETTER INFORMED ABOUT CIA'S INFORMATION AND ASSESSMENTS ON A GIVEN SUBJECT THAN THE POLICYMAKER. AND THAT INTELLIGENCE IS OFTEN USED TO CRITICIZE AND CHALLENGE POLICY, TO SET ONE EXECUTIVE AGENCY AGAINST ANOTHER, AND TO EXPOSE DISAGREEMENTS WITHIN AN ADMINISTRATION.

MOST SPECIALISTS WRITING ABOUT THE CHANGED BALANCE OF POWER IN RECENT YEARS BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND CONGRESS ON NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY, CITE WATERGATE AND VIETNAM AS PRIMARY CAUSES. I BELIEVE THERE WAS A THIRD PRINCIPAL FACTOR -- WHEN CONGRESS OBTAINED ACCESS TO INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION IN THE MID-1970S ESSENTIALLY EQUAL TO THAT OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH.

- 0 IMAGINE THE REACTION OF THE FORD ADMINISTRATION IN THE MID-70S WHEN THEY WENT TO CONGRESS TO GET ADDITIONAL MONEY FOR CAMBODIA ONLY TO BE CONFRONTED BY THE LEGISLATORS WITH A NEW INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT THAT THE SITUATION WAS HOPELESS.
- 0 IMAGINE PRESIDENT CARTER SEEKING A US TROOP CUT IN SOUTH KOREA ONLY TO FIND CONGRESS AWARE OF A NEW INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE THAT CONCLUDED THE NUMBER OF NORTH KOREAN DIVISIONS HAD GROWN.
- 0 IMAGINE THE REACTION OF A SECRETARY OF DEFENSE SEEKING FUNDS FOR A NEW WEAPON ONLY TO BE TOLD ON THE HILL OF INTELLIGENCE THAT THE SOVIETS COULD NEUTRALIZE THE WEAPON.

THIS SITUATION ADDS EXTRAORDINARY STRESS TO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CIA AND POLICY AGENCIES. POLICYMAKER SUSPICION OF CIA USING INTELLIGENCE TO SABOTAGE SELECTED ADMINISTRATION POLICIES IS OFTEN NOT FAR BELOW THE SURFACE. AND NOT A FEW MEMBERS OF CONGRESS ARE WILLING TO EXPLOIT THIS SITUATION BY THEIR OWN SELECTIVE USE OF INTELLIGENCE THAT SUPPORTS THEIR VIEWS. THE END RESULT IS TO STRENGTHEN THE

CONGRESSIONAL HAND IN POLICY DEBATES AND TO HEIGHTEN GREATLY THE TENSIONS BETWEEN CIA AND THE REST OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH.

THE OVERSIGHT PROCESS HAS ALSO GIVEN CONGRESS -- ESPECIALLY THE TWO INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES -- FAR GREATER KNOWLEDGE OF AND INFLUENCE OVER THE WAY CIA AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES SPEND THEIR MONEY THAN ANYONE IN THE EXECUTIVE WOULD DREAM OF EXERCISING: FROM EXPENDITURES IN THE BILLIONS TO LINE ITEMS IN THE THOUSANDS. CONGRESS HAS BEEN IMMENSELY SUPPORTIVE AND STEADFAST IN PROVIDING THE RESOURCES OVER THE PAST TEN YEARS TO REBUILD AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE. BUT I SUSPECT IT CAUSES POLICYMAKERS CONSIDERABLE HEARTBURN TO KNOW THAT CONGRESS MAY ACTUALLY HAVE MORE INFLUENCE TODAY OVER OUR PRIORITIES AND HOW WE SPEND OUR MONEY THAN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH.

THE RESULT OF THESE REALITIES IS THAT CIA TODAY IS IN A REMARKABLE POSITION, POISED NEARLY EQUIDISTANT BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES -- THE FORMER KNOWS THAT CIA IS IN NO POSITION TO WITHHOLD MUCH FROM CONGRESS AND IS EXTREMELY SENSITIVE TO IT, THE CONGRESS HAS ENORMOUS INFLUENCE AND INFORMATION YET REMAINS SUSPICIOUS AND MISTRUSTFUL. THIS MAY BE OR MAY NOT BE HISTORICALLY CHARACTERISTIC OF OTHER EXECUTIVE

DEPARTMENTS' RELATIONSHIPS WITH CONGRESS, ALTHOUGH I SUSPECT NOT. REGARDLESS, SUCH A CENTRAL LEGISLATIVE ROLE WITH RESPECT TO AN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IS UNIQUE IN OUR HISTORY AND IN THE WORLD. AND OUR POLICYMAKERS KNOW IT.

NOW, LET ME TURN TO CIA'S ROLE AND RELATIONSHIP WITH THE POLICYMAKER AS SEEN FROM OUR VANTAGE POINT.

-- LET ME SAY AT THE OUTSET THAT IN EVERY ADMINISTRATION DURING WHICH I HAVE SERVED THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF SENIOR POLICYMAKERS (ASSISTANT SECRETARY AND ABOVE) WHO WERE AVID USERS AND READERS OF INTELLIGENCE AND WHO AGGRESSIVELY SOUGHT CIA ANALYSIS AND VIEWS. THEY DEDICATED CONSIDERABLE TIME TO TALKING ABOUT SUBSTANTIVE AND POLICY PROBLEMS WITH US. WE HAVE HAD UNPRECEDENTED ACCESS IN THIS ADMINISTRATION FROM THE PRESIDENT ON DOWN, ESPECIALLY FOR ANALYSIS, AND DAILY CONTACT WITH THE MOST SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING THE VICE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARIES OF STATE AND DEFENSE. THEY HAVE OFTEN DIRECTLY TASKED US AND OFFERED REACTIONS TO THE INTELLIGENCE THEY READ -- AND THEY HAVE READ A GREAT DEAL. THIS IS TRUE ALSO OF THEIR SENIOR SUBORDINATES, WITH WHOM WE ARE IN CONSTANT CONTACT. THIS HAS CONTRIBUTED ENORMOUSLY TO IMPROVING THE RELEVANCE,

TIMING, AND SUBSTANCE OF OUR ANALYSIS AND OTHER SUPPORT. IT IS A DYNAMIC, HEALTHY RELATIONSHIP, EVEN THOUGH IT IS FOCUSED PRIMARILY ON CURRENT ISSUES.

-- THIS PREOCCUPATION WITH CURRENT REPORTING IS, FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE, A MAJOR PROBLEM. IF, AS I HAVE BEEN TOLD, THE AVERAGE TENURE OF AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY IN GOVERNMENT IS 21 MONTHS, A SHORT TERM FOCUS IS UNDERSTANDABLE BUT LAMENTABLE, AND, ULTIMATELY, VERY COSTLY TO OUR COUNTRY. ONE OF OUR GREATEST CONCERNS OVER THE YEARS HAS BEEN THE UNWILLINGNESS OR INABILITY OF MOST POLICYMAKERS TO SPEND MUCH TIME ON LONGER RANGE ISSUES -- LOOKING AHEAD SEVERAL STEPS -- OR IN HELPING TO GUIDE OR DIRECT OUR EFFORTS. FOR MANY YEARS WE HAVE STRUGGLED, LARGELY IN VAIN, TO GET POLICY OFFICIALS TO DEVOTE TIME TO NON-CRISIS RELATED INTELLIGENCE ISSUES. FOR EXAMPLE, WE WORK HARD TO DETERMINE THEIR REQUIREMENTS -- WHAT ARE THEIR PRIORITIES, WHAT ISSUES OR PROBLEMS SHOULD WE ADDRESS, HOW CAN WE HELP? ONE REASON CONGRESS HAS ASSUMED A LARGER ROLE IN THESE AREAS, IN MY VIEW, IS BECAUSE POLICYMAKERS IN SUCCESSIVE ADMINISTRATIONS HAVE LARGELY ABDICATED THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES. FOR MANY YEARS, TRYING TO GET SENIOR POLICY PRINCIPALS TO MEETINGS TO DISCUSS LONGER RANGE INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS HAS BEEN AN EXERCISE IN FRUSTRATION. BEYOND THE LACK OF HELP ON REQUIREMENTS,

WE GET LITTLE FEEDBACK ON OUR LONGER RANGE WORK TO HELP US BE MORE RESPONSIVE. WE HAVE BEEN MORE AGGRESSIVE IN RECENT YEARS IN TRYING TO ENGAGE POLICYMAKERS ON THESE MATTERS, AND KEY FIGURES IN THIS ADMINISTRATION HAVE SHOWN SOME INTEREST IN SELECTED LONG RANGE PROBLEMS, BUT SUCH INTEREST REMAINS EXCEEDINGLY, DANGEROUSLY RARE.

-- IN PART BECAUSE OF INSUFFICIENT TIME SPENT ON INTELLIGENCE, TOO MANY POLICYMAKERS EARLY ON HAVE UNREALISTIC EXPECTATIONS ABOUT WHAT WE CAN DO THAT, WHEN DISAPPOINTED, TURN TO SKEPTICISM WHETHER WE CAN DO ANYTHING.

-- IT HAS BEEN MY EXPERIENCE OVER THE YEARS THAT THE POLICYMAKERS' RESPONSE TO INTELLIGENCE THEY DISAGREE WITH OR FIND UNPALATABLE MOST OFTEN IS TO IGNORE IT; SOMETIMES, THEY WILL CHARACTERIZE IT AS INCOMPLETE, TOO NARROWLY FOCUSED OR AS INCOMPETENT (AND THEY ARE SOMETIMES RIGHT); AND OCCASIONALLY THEY WILL CHARGE THAT IT IS "COOKED" OR THAT IT REFLECTS A CIA BIAS. IN 21 YEARS IN INTELLIGENCE, I HAVE NEVER HEARD A POLICYMAKER (OR ANYONE ELSE FOR THAT MATTER) CHARACTERIZE AS BIASED OR COOKED A CIA ASSESSMENT WITH WHICH HE AGREED. ON VIETNAM, VARIOUS ASPECTS OF SOVIET POLICY AND BEHAVIOR, ANGOLA, LEBANON, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EMBARGOES OR SANCTIONS, AND OTHER ISSUES OVER THE

YEARS, OUR ANALYSTS HAVE DRAWN CONCLUSIONS THAT DASH COLD WATER ON THE HOPES AND EFFORTS OF THE POLICYMAKERS. SOMETIMES WE HAVE BEEN WRONG, BUT ON PROBLEMS LARGE AND SMALL WE HAVE NOT FLINCHED FROM PRESENTING OUR HONEST VIEW.

THERE IS NO CHARGE TO WHICH WE IN CIA ARE MORE SENSITIVE THAN THAT OF "COOKING" INTELLIGENCE -- OF SLANTING OUR REPORTING TO SUPPORT POLICY. EVERY DIRECTOR SINCE I JOINED CIA HAS BEEN ACCUSED OF THIS AT ONE TIME OR ANOTHER, I BELIEVE IN VIRTUALLY ALL INSTANCES UNFAIRLY. FIRST, ONE MUST UNDERSTAND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PERSONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL VIEWS. NATIONAL ESTIMATES ARE REVIEWED AND COORDINATED BY A DOZEN AGENCIES; CIA ASSESSMENTS ARE WIDELY REVIEWED INSIDE THE AGENCY BUT ALMOST NEVER EVEN SEEN BY THE DIRECTOR BEFORE BEING PUBLISHED AND CIRCULATED. AS NOTED EARLIER, ALL GO TO SEVERAL COMMITTEES OF THE CONGRESS, WHERE THEY ARE SCRUTINIZED.

THESE FORMAL ASSESSMENTS MUST BE DISTINGUISHED FROM PERSONAL VIEWS EXPRESSED BY INDIVIDUALS AT ALL LEVELS OF THE AGENCY, FROM ANALYST TO SENIOR OPERATIONS OFFICER TO DIRECTOR. MORE THAN ONCE, DCI CASEY (AND PROBABLY HIS PREDECESSORS) APPROVED AN ESTIMATE WITH WHICH HE DISAGREED PERSONALLY, AND SEPARATELY CONVEYED

HIS PERSONAL VIEW TO POLICYMAKERS. LEST THIS RAISE EYEBROWS, I REMIND YOU THAT IN 1962 DCI MCCONE DISAGREED WITH THE ENTIRE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ON WHETHER THE SOVIETS MIGHT INSTALL MISSILES IN CUBA. HE TOLD PRESIDENT KENNEDY THEY WOULD, AND HE ALONE IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH WAS RIGHT. AND, I SHOULD ADD, I AM TOLD, THIS COST HIM HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PRESIDENT. AS LONG AS ALL POINTS OF VIEW ARE FAIRLY REPRESENTED AND REPORTED, THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE -- THE PRESIDENT'S CHIEF INTELLIGENCE ADVISER -- IS ENTITLED (EVEN OBLIGATED) TO HAVE AND TO PUT FORWARD HIS OWN VIEW. AS PROFESSOR HENRY ROWEN OF STANFORD UNIVERSITY RECENTLY WROTE IN THE NEW YORK TIMES, "... A CIA DIRECTOR IS NOT SUPPOSED TO BE AN INTELLECTUAL EUNUCH."

POLICYMAKERS HAVE ALWAYS LIKED INTELLIGENCE THAT SUPPORTED WHAT THEY WANT TO DO, AND THEY OFTEN TRY TO INFLUENCE THE ANALYSIS TO COME TO CONCLUSIONS THEY WANT. THEY ASK CAREFULLY PHRASED QUESTIONS; THEY SOMETIMES WITHHOLD INFORMATION; THEY BROADEN OR NARROW THE ISSUE; ON RARE OCCASIONS, THEY EVEN TRY TO INTIMIDATE. THE PRESSURES CAN BE ENORMOUS. THIS IS WHERE THE INTEGRITY OF INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS, BOLSTERED BY A NATURAL TENDENCY TO RESIST PRESSURE AND AN OFTEN ADVERSARIAL BUREAUCRATIC RELATIONSHIP, COMES INTO PLAY TO PROTECT THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE ASSESSMENT.

BUT, OVERALL, YOU MUST UNDERSTAND THAT THE GIVE AND TAKE -- THE DIALOGUE -- BETWEEN POLICYMAKER AND INTELLIGENCE OFFICER ON ISSUES IS NORMAL, HEALTHY, AND USUALLY IMPROVES OUR ASSESSMENTS AND MAKES THEM MORE USEFUL TO THE POLICYMAKER -- EVEN WHILE OBJECTIVITY IS PRESERVED. WE KNOW THEY ARE OFTEN TRYING TO INFLUENCE AN ASSESSMENT, BUT THAT DOES NOT RENDER THEIR INFORMATION AND INSIGHTS IRRELEVANT OR OFF-LIMITS.

A FINAL THOUGHT. TO ATTEMPT TO SLANT INTELLIGENCE NOT ONLY TRANGRESSES THE DEEPEST ETHICAL AND CULTURAL PRINCIPLE OF CIA, WE ALL KNOW IT WOULD ALSO BE FOOLISH -- IT WOULD PRESUPPOSE A SINGLE POINT OF VIEW IN AN ADMINISTRATION AND WOULD IGNORE THE REALITY OF CONGRESSIONAL READERSHIP. INDEED, IN MY OPINION, THE SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE WITH CONGRESS IS ONE OF THE SUREST GUARANTEES OF CIA'S INDEPENDENCE AND OBJECTIVITY. AS DIRECTOR WEBSTER HAS SAID, "WE INTEND TO 'TELL IT AS IT IS,' AVOIDING BIAS AS MUCH AS WE CAN, OR THE POLITICIZATION OF OUR PRODUCT. POLICYMAKERS MAY NOT LIKE THE MESSAGE THEY HEAR FROM US, ESPECIALLY IF THEY HAVE A DIFFERENT POINT OF VIEW. MY POSITION IS THAT IN THE PREPARATION OF INTELLIGENCE JUDGMENTS, PARTICULARLY IN NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES, WE WILL PROVIDE THEM FOR THE USE OF POLICYMAKERS. THEY

CAN BE USED IN WHOLE OR IN PART. THEY CAN BE IGNORED, OR TORN UP, OR THROWN AWAY, BUT THEY MAY NOT BE CHANGED."

CONCLUSION

WHAT I HAVE DESCRIBED HERE IS THE REALITY OF CIA'S ROLE IN THE MAKING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. I HAVE TRIED TO GO BEYOND THE MECHANICS AND THE HEADLINES TO IDENTIFY THE STRESSES, TENSIONS, RIVALRIES, ENDURING COMPLAINTS AND RELATIONSHIPS -- THE PULLING AND HAULING, DAY IN AND DAY OUT, REAL LIFE IF YOU WILL -- THAT DETERMINE CIA'S ROLE AND ITS IMPACT. SOME OF OUR ANALYSES ARE BETTER THAN OTHERS; SOME INTELLIGENCE EXPERTS ARE BETTER THAN OTHERS; ESTIMATES SOMETIMES ALLEGED TO BE POLITICIZED OR BIASED WERE NOT THAT AT ALL -- SOMETIMES THEY WERE JUST NOT VERY WELL DONE. BUT UNEVENNESS OF QUALITY SHOULD NOT BE CONFUSED WITH POLITICIZATION.

CIA'S AUTONOMY IS UNIQUE IN OUR GOVERNMENT, ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE LEGISLATURE IS UNIQUE IN THE WORLD. OUR RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE EXECUTIVE ARE A DYNAMIC BLEND OF SUPPORT AND RIVALRY, OF COOPERATION AND CONFLICT. OUR CHALLENGE IS TO MANAGE THOSE RELATIONSHIPS SO

THAT THE WHOLE RANGE OF INTERACTIONS -- SUPPORTIVE AND ADVERSARIAL -- NET OUT TO PROMOTE BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF AN EVER MORE COMPLEX WORLD AROUND US AND HENCE CONTRIBUTE TO BETTER INFORMED DECISIONS AND POLICIES.

THE REAL INTELLIGENCE STORY IN RECENT YEARS IS THE SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT, WITH HELP FROM BOTH THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS, IN THE QUALITY, RELEVANCE AND TIMELINESS OF INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO THE POLICYMAKER -- A STORY THAT HAS BEEN NEGLECTED IN PREFERENCE TO CONTROVERSIAL COVERT ACTIONS, PROBLEMS BETWEEN CIA AND THE CONGRESS, AND SPY SCANDALS. WE UNDERSTAND THIS POLITICAL REALITY, BUT IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT AMERICANS KNOW THAT OUR PRIMARY MISSION REMAINS THE COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION. THIS IS OUR PRIMARY ROLE IN THE MAKING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. AS RANELAGH OBSERVES, "... SO FAR FROM BEING THE SECRET POLICE THAT TRUMAN AND MANY THOUGHTFUL PEOPLE HAD FEARED ONLY HALF A LIFETIME EARLIER, THE CIA [IS] NOW TAKEN FOR GRANTED AS A MODERATE AND CONSTITUTIONAL ARM OF THE AMERICAN STATE." THE PRESIDENT, THE POLICY COMMUNITY, AND THE CONGRESS -- ALBEIT SOMETIMES WITH CLENCHED TEETH -- DEPEND UPON US, TASK US, AND LOOK TO US MORE EACH DAY. WE ATTRACT AMERICA'S BRIGHTEST YOUNG PEOPLE, WHO FIND WITH CIA EXCEPTIONALLY CHALLENGING, HONORABLE, AND CONSISTENTLY FASCINATING CAREERS. TO QUOTE RANELAGH A FINAL TIME, IN THE LAST SENTENCE OF HIS BOOK, HE STATES, "IN ITS MOMENTS OF ACHIEVEMENT AS WELL AS CONDEMNATION, THE AGENCY WAS A REMINDER

THAT IT WAS A FAITHFUL INSTRUMENT OF THE MOST DECENT AND PERHAPS THE SIMPLEST OF THE GREAT POWERS, AND CERTAINLY THE ONE THAT EVEN IN ITS DARKEST PASSAGES PRACTICED MOST CONSISTENTLY THE VIRTUE OF HOPE."

THE UNITED STATES HAS THE FINEST GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IN THE WORLD. FAITHFUL TO THE CONSTITUTION AND THE LAWS, IT HELPS TO SAFEGUARD OUR FREEDOM AGAINST OUR ADVERSARIES AND HELPS THE POLICYMAKER UNDERSTAND AND DEAL WITH THE OFTEN DANGEROUS WORLD AROUND US. CIA IS TRULY AMERICA'S FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE -- ITS EYES AND EARS. AND OUR DEEPEST COMMITMENT, TO BORROW A PHRASE USED BY ERIC LARRABEE TO DESCRIBE GEORGE MARSHALL, IS "TO SPEAK TRUTH TO POWER."